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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision to terminate parental rights is a serious one. Parents
have a constitutional right to raise and rear their children—a right
that is limited by the welfare of the child.1 Striking an appropriate
balance between these two rights is a delicate task. On the one hand,
the law cannot be such that children are constitutionally required to
grow up with parents who will not or cannot provide them with ade-
quate support and care.2 On the other hand, the constitution does not
require perfect parenting. Parents are provided wide latitude to make
mistakes and raise their children in ways that others in society may
find questionable.3
The question of what constitutes “good enough” parenting is com-
plicated further by the fact that many parents live with mental chal-
lenges of varying severity. For the purposes of this Comment, the term
“mental challenge” will refer to any “mental disorder” listed in the
Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM-5 or DSM). The DSM-5 defines mental disorder as “a syn-
drome characterized by a clinically significant disturbance in an
1. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); see also B.K. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 166 So. 3d 866, 872 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (“A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and companionship of his child . . . . The only limitation on this right is
‘the ultimate welfare of the child itself.’ ” (quoting Padgett v. Dep’t of Health
Rehab. Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991))).
2. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. The Court notes that “[t]he private
interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection”
while simultaneously acknowledging the State’s duty to protect minor children,
refusing to “question the assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from
their parents.” Id. at 649, 651–52. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603
(1979) (“[A] state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in
dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”).
3. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State.”).
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individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental
processes underlying mental functioning.”4 The DSM-5 groups mental
illnesses, intellectual disabilities, “pervasive developmental disorders,
motor skills disorders, communication disorders, elimination disor-
ders, attention-deficit and disruptive behavior disorders, and learning
disorders” together as mental disorders.5
Twenty percent of adults in the United States report suffering
from some type of mental illness, including one million parents of mi-
nor children suffering from a serious psychiatric disorder.6 Over five
million children in the United States have a parent with a serious
mental illness (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depres-
sive disorder).7 Although judges cannot terminate parental rights sim-
ply because a parent has been diagnosed with a mental disorder,8
parents with mental challenges are at an increased risk of losing cus-
tody or, worse, parental rights to their children.9 Some researchers
4. Charisa Smith, Mental Health and the Law: The Conundrum of Family Reunifi-
cation: A Theoretical, Legal, and Practical Approach to Reunification Services for
Parents with Mental Disabilities, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 312–13 (2015)
[hereinafter Mental Health and the Law] (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOS-
TIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-V (5th ed. 2013) [here-
inafter DSM-5]):
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress in so-
cial, occupational, or other important activities. An expectable or cultur-
ally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of
a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behavior (e.g., po-
litical, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the
individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance of
conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual.
Id.
5. Id.; DSM-5.
6. Charisa Smith, Finding Solutions to the Termination of Parental Rights in Par-
ents with Mental Challenges, 39 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 205, 209–10 (2014–2015)
[hereinafter Finding Solutions].
7. Id. at 210.
8. See State v. Tammie S., 14 Neb. App. 202, 211–12 (2005) (“By itself, this progno-
sis [i.e., diagnoses of schizophrenia and borderline intellectual functioning], does
not preclude a parent from parenting a child”). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-
292(5) (Reissue 2009), which specifies that termination is only appropriate when
a parent’s mental illness renders them “unable to discharge parental responsibili-
ties because of mental illness.” Id. Additionally, the “individual inquiry” required
by Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), suggests that courts must individually
determine the parental fitness of each parent. Termination based on the fact of a
DSM diagnosis precludes this individual inquiry requirement.
9. Traci LaLiberte et al., Child Protection Services and Parents with Intellectual
and Developmental Disabilities, 30 J. APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES 521
(2017); Elizabeth Lightfoot & Sharyn Dezelar, The Experiences and Outcomes of
Children in Foster Care Who Were Removed Because of a Parental Disability, 62
CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 22, 22 (2016).
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estimate that up to 80% of parents with mental illnesses have lost
custody of their children.10
This Comment will argue that the parental rights termination
statutes that list “mental illness or mental deficiency” as a ground for
termination promote the stigmatization of parents with mental chal-
lenges. As Nebraska is one of the states with this language included in
its statute,11 this Comment will specifically emphasize Nebraska stat-
utes and cases. Part II of this Comment will provide information about
the history and nature of parental rights termination statutes and the
process of parental rights termination hearings. It will then discuss
empirical evidence documenting the stigma against people with
mental challenges as well as evidence that mental challenges do not
equate with unfit parenting. Part III will argue that including mental
illness or mental deficiency as a ground for termination promotes the
stigmatization of parents with mental challenges without providing
any additional protections for their children. Part III will conclude
with a discussion of some alternatives to termination when attempt-
ing to strike the delicate balance between protecting the rights of both
the parents and their children.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Parental Rights Termination Statutes
Since the mid-nineteenth century, state statutes have allowed
courts to “withdraw the infants from the custody of the father or
mother and place the care and custody of them elsewhere . . . when the
morals, or safety, or interests of the children strongly require it.”12
These separations range in severity from the child’s temporary re-
moval from the parent’s custody to the termination of the parent’s pa-
rental rights.13 In these proceedings to terminate parental rights, the
legal ties between parents and their biological children are severed in
order to allow other, allegedly “better,” individuals to exercise those
parental rights.14
10. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 210.
11. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 2009) (“The court may terminate all paren-
tal rights between the parents or the mother of a juvenile born out of wedlock and
such juvenile when the court finds such action to be in the best interests of the
juvenile and it appears by the evidence that . . . . The parents are unable to dis-
charge parental responsibilities because of mental illness or mental deficiency
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will continue for
a prolonged indeterminate period.”).
12. Elizabeth Lightfoot et al., The Inclusion of Disability as a Condition for Termina-
tion of Parental Rights, 34 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 927, 929 (2010) (citing 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 211 (7th ed., New York: William
Kent)) [hereinafter Inclusion of Disability].
13. Id.
14. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 206.
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In an attempt to avoid termination and instead promote the
reunification of biological families, Congress passed the Adoption As-
sistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA).15 When a child was
removed from his or her home, the AACWA required reasonable ef-
forts to prevent removal or make it possible for the child to return
home.16 However, the statute provided no guidance as to what consti-
tuted reasonable efforts.17 Additionally, as children were removed
from their homes, they often got lost in “foster care drift.”18 Because
the parents retained their parental rights, new families could not
adopt the children. But it would often take the parents months, if not
years, to improve their parenting capabilities—assuming they could
at all. Thus, the children were stuck in legal limbo. They could not be
adopted, but they also could not return to their parents.19
In order to resolve this problem of foster care drift, Congress
passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 in order to
shift the focus from reunification to adoption.20 The ASFA’s most im-
portant modification of the AACWA was the inclusion of the 15/22 pro-
vision. The ASFA requires states to begin a parental rights
termination hearing if a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the
last twenty-two months.21 However, because the ASFA is a federal
statute, states have the liberty to adopt their own variations of these
provisions. Twenty-nine states have adopted the 15/22 provision, and
some, like Alabama, Iowa, and New Hampshire, have adopted even
stricter timelines.22 In one study, Elizabeth Lightfoot and her col-
15. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994).
17. See id. Nowhere in the AACWA are the reasonable effort requirements described
or defined.
18. Emily K. Nicholson, Racing Against the ASFA Clock: How Incarcerated Parents
Lose More than Freedom, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 83, 84 n.11 (2006) (citing Amy Wilkin-
son-Hagen, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision of Parens
Patriae and Parents’ Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 137,
142 (2004)). “Foster care drift” refers to the problem of children entering the fos-
ter care system without the opportunity for permanent placement. The children
cannot be adopted because their parents have retained their parental rights.
However, because the parents are presently unfit to provide the requisite care
and support, the children cannot return to their parents’ custody. Thus, foster
care drift refers to the experience of children growing up in a slew of foster homes
because they can neither return to the care of their biological parents nor be
adopted by a different family. See id.
19. Id. at 84.
20. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2118 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
21. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINA-
TION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 3 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/system
wide/laws-policies/statutes/groundtermin/ [https://perma.unl.edu/9BU5-D3NW]
(provides list of state termination statutes).
22. Id.
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leagues found that 61.3% of their sample of parents with mental disa-
bilities had a petition for termination of parental rights filed within
twelve months of opening their case.23
In addition, the ASFA amended the AACWA to allow for concur-
rent planning. Under the ASFA, courts can explore reunification and
termination at the same time.24 Thus, with some exceptions, the
ASFA still requires reasonable efforts before parental rights can be
terminated.25 However, the newly amended statute failed to provide
any further guidance on what constituted reasonable efforts or who
was entitled to them. Thirty states, including Nebraska, require
reunification services.26 In eight states and Puerto Rico, “mental ill-
ness of such duration or severity that there is little likelihood that the
parent will be able to resume care for the child within a reasonable
time” is an aggravating circumstance that warrants the waiver of rea-
sonable efforts.27
B. Parental Rights Termination Proceedings
Although there are no standard rules as to how these proceedings
should occur, most states follow a two-step process to terminate pa-
rental rights.28 First, the court must determine if a statutory ground
for termination exists.29 Once the court determines that at least one
statutory ground exists, the court can only terminate parental rights
if doing so is in the best interests of the child.30 It is presumed that
23. Elizabeth Lightfoot et al., A Case Record Review of Termination of Parental
Rights Cases Involving Parents with a Disability, 79 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV.
399, 405 (2017) [hereinafter Review of Termination of Rights Cases].
24. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(15)(D)(i)–(ii) (2010). Reasonable efforts are not required if the
parent has subjected the child to “aggravated circumstances” (e.g., abandonment,
torture, chronic abuse, and/or sexual abuse); committed murder, voluntary man-
slaughter, or a felony assault against the child; or if the individual has involunta-
rily lost parental rights to another child. Id.
26. Dale Margolin, No Chance to Prove Themselves: The Rights of Mentally Disabled
Parents Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and State Law, 15 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 112 app. B at 179–82 (2007).
27. Mental Health and the Law, supra note 4, at 325–26 (citing CHILD WELFARE IN-
FORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 21).
28. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341; DEL. CODE ANN. tit 13, § 1103; GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-11-310; NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292 (Reissue 2016); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-113.
29. In re R.C., 886 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016).
30. In re M.L.G.J., No. 14-14-00800-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2750 (App. Mar. 24,
2015); Wayne G. v. Jacqueline W., 21 Neb. App 551, 842 N.W.2d 125 (2013).
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remaining with the biological parent is in the child’s best interests.31
However, showing parental unfitness rebuts that presumption.32
Parental unfitness is found when there is “a personal deficiency or
incapacity which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance
of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which caused,
or probably will result in, detriment to a child’s wellbeing.”33 In other
words, the presumption that it is in the child’s best interests to remain
with his or her biological parents can be overcome by showing that it
is not in the child’s best interests to remain with his or her biological
parents. This presumption therefore provides very little protection for
the biological parent whose parental fitness is in question.34 Even so,
termination cannot occur unless the State shows by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests.35
1. Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as a Ground to Terminate
Parental Rights
Mental illness or deficiency is a ground for termination of parental
rights in approximately 75% of states (including Nebraska) when it
allegedly makes an individual unable to perform his or her parental
responsibilities.36 However, exactly what constitutes mental illness or
deficiency is often unclear.37 The statutory language used to refer to
mental impairment is often outdated, which makes it difficult to com-
pare to legal, medical, and social definitions of mental illness and dis-
ability.38 Many of these statutes do not define these outdated terms,
making it more difficult to identify exactly which kinds of impair-
31. State v. Victoria R. (In re Mitoria R.), No. A-15-1049, 2016 Neb. App. LEXIS 130,
at *28 (Ct. App. June 21, 2016).
32. Id.
33. Id. at *29.
34. See id. Parental “unfitness” is based on a determination of the best interests of
the child. And though the best-interest analysis and the parental fitness analysis
are technically separate inquiries, they examine the same facts. Id. Thus, it is
difficult to see how the two inquiries could lead to conflicting results. But see
Matter of R.D.D.-G v. T.M.D., 365 Or. 143 (2019) (termination of mother’s paren-
tal rights was not in the child’s best interest, even after the mother was found to
be unfit, because a petition for permanent guardianship could be granted). How-
ever, Nebraska courts rarely, if ever, rule in this manner. See In re C.A.A., 229
Neb. 135, 138, 425 N.W.2d 621, 623 (1988) (court terminated parental rights de-
spite mother’s request to establish a guardianship for the children so as to pre-
serve the bond between mother and child).
35. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 206.
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 2016); Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at
207.
37. See Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12.
38. Id. at 932. Twenty-one states refer to intellectual disabilities and developmental
disabilities as a “mental deficiency,” which was the term commonly used in the
1940s through the 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, the term was replaced with
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ments constitute grounds for termination.39 For example, twenty-one
state statutes include mental deficiency as a ground for termination
but do not define the term anywhere in the statute.40 Nor do these
statutes define “mental illness.”41
Without a statutory definition of mental illness or mental defi-
ciency, courts generally look for a DSM diagnosis of a mental disor-
der.42 For example, in State v. Tracy G., the court terminated Tracy’s
parental rights under NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) without ever defin-
ing “mental illness or mental deficiency.”43 Instead, the court merely
stated that “Tracy suffers from mental illness and mental deficiency
that have plagued her since at least high school.”44 Rather than apply-
ing a statutory definition, the court looked to the results of a psycho-
logical evaluation which ultimately diagnosed Tracy with “depressive
disorder, mild mental retardation, and mild cognitive impairment.”45
This court used the results of the psychological evaluation (which pre-
sumably used the DSM diagnostic criteria) to define a mental illness
or deficiency as laid out in the statute. This analytical process is not
uncommon in court opinions.46
2. The Best Interests of the Child Standard
All family law disputes involving children (including custody and
parental rights termination decisions) use the best interests of the
child standard.47 Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
“mental retardation.” However, “intellectual disability” is currently used in order




42. See, e.g., State v. Brandy S. (In re Nicole M.), 287 Neb. 685, 844 N.W.2d 65 (2014);
State v. Tracy G. (In re Interest of Ashe G.), No. A-12-748, 2013 WL 2106759
(Neb. App. Apr. 23, 2013).
43. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 2016) (stating parental rights may be termi-
nated if it shown that the parent is “unable to discharge parental responsibilities
because of mental illness or mental deficiency and there are reasonable grounds
to believe that such condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate pe-
riod”); Tracy G., 2013 WL 2106759.
44. Tracy G., 2013 WL 2106759, at *5.
45. Id. at *1.
46. See, e.g., Brandy S., 287 Neb. at 706, 844 N.W.2d at 81 (court terminated paren-
tal rights after determining, in part, that Brandy’s diagnosis of “sufficient mood
variability of both depressive and hypomanic symptoms” suggested parental un-
fitness); In re Interest of C.A.A., 229 Neb. 135, 425 N.W. 2d 621 (1988) (court
terminated parental rights after concluding that the mother’s “problems” re-
sulted from psychiatric diagnoses of “borderline intellectual ability” and “depen-
dent personality disorder”); In re Interest of T.E., 235 Neb. 420, 423, 455 N.W.2d
562, 564 (1990) (used mother’s schizophrenia diagnosis as evidence of her mental
illness or deficiency).
47. Hon. Edmund M. Dane & Jamie A. Rosen, View from the Bench: Parental Mental
Health and Child Custody, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 10, 11 (2016).
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Act (UMDA) summarizes case and statutory law in order to provide a
model for the best interests of the child standard.48 Though not bind-
ing authority, the UMDA laid out a five-factor model that “aimed to
take the child’s wishes into account, determine the most suitable
caregiver for the child, and allow the child to maintain a healthy rela-
tionship with the non-custodial parent.”49 The best interests of the
child standard used in termination proceedings is derived from the
UMDA’s five-factor model.50
The first factor to be considered is “the wishes of the child’s par-
ent.”51 As previously noted, there is a presumption that it is in the
child’s best interests for the biological parents—not a third party—to
raise the child.52 The second factor is “the wishes of the child.”53 This
factor recognizes that there may be a good reason why a child does or
does not want to live with one particular parent.54 The third factor is
“the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly af-
fect the child’s best interests.”55 Consideration of this particular factor
is important because it ensures the child does not end up in an abu-
sive home.56
The fourth factor is “the child’s adjustment to his home, school, and
community.”57 In considering this factor, the court might look at how
a child would cope with the loss of regular contact with one or both
parents, the psychological effects of leaving a known community,
which parent might be more willing to cooperate with the other, how a
move might affect the child, and the reasons and motivations for mov-
ing the child.58 The final consideration—and the one most relevant to
this Comment—is “the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.”59 This factor requires a nexus between the impaired health
48. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1974).
49. Erin Bajackson, Best Interests of the Child—A Legislative Journey Still in Mo-
tion, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 311, 315 (2013).
50. Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and the Pendulum Swings in
Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L. Q. 381, 394
(2008). Only eight states adopted the entire UMDA, but many legislatures took
these five factors and added to them. In some states, the judiciary created the
factors. Id.
51. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(1).
52. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 316. See supra notes 31–35 and relevant text.
53. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(2).
54. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 317.
55. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(3).
56. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 318.
57. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(4).
58. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 320.
59. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402(4). Five states (Alabama, Indiana, Maine,
Tennessee, and Virginia) include drug and/or alcohol addiction in their defini-
tions of mental illness. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 320.
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of the parent and said parent’s parenting abilities.60 However, the
UMDA, and the termination statutes derived from it, provides no gui-
dance as to the point at which the mental health of the parents be-
comes grounds for termination. Nor does the UMDA articulate how
many factors need to weigh in favor of termination or how much
weight to give a particular factor.61
Clearly, this standard is broad and allows judges to consider a mul-
titude of factors. Proponents of this standard argue that it is a “fact-
driven process that most accurately protects a child’s physical, psycho-
logical, and emotional needs.”62 However, the standard provides very
little guidance as to what exactly constitutes the child’s best inter-
ests.63 Forty-five states have adopted different versions of the best in-
terests standard, and seven of those states do not list any factors at
all.64 Consequently, critics argue that the lack of clear, consistent fac-
tors renders the standard an “egocentric, utilitarian product of the
state’s design to make children productive members of society rather
than burdens upon it later in life.”65 This becomes a problem if the
judge, arguably, operates under the assumption that parents with
mental challenges do not make as good of parents as those without
those mental challenges.66 As this Comment argues, this lack of gui-
dance allows courts to weigh a parent’s mental illness or disability
more heavily than they perhaps should.
3. The Use of Parenting Evaluations to Make Parental Rights
Termination Decisions
There is a strong argument that judges are unfit to make the best
interests of the child decision.67 Judges are not trained in navigating
the complicated, and often hostile, family relationships that arise in
courtrooms.68 Nor do they receive specific training in child develop-
ment or mental health.69 As a result, courts may ask for a professional
60. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 322.
61. Anat S. Geva, Judicial Determination of Child Custody When a Parent Is Men-
tally Ill: A Little Bit of Law, a Little Bit of Pop Psychology, and a Little Bit of
Common Sense, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 13 (2012).
62. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 311.
63. See Geva, supra note 61, at 13.
64. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 348.
65. Id. at 311. Other critics have argued that the standard is “indeterminate and
unpredictable.” See Elrod & Dale, supra note 50, at 392.
66. Geva, supra note 61, at 13–14.
67. Id. at 8 (finding that judges “generally do not possess adequate knowledge and
training to be able to make sufficiently informed decisions about the best interest
of a child where a contesting parent has a mental health problem”).
68. Id.
69. Bajackson, supra note 49, at 384.
756 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:746
psychological or parenting evaluation in order to help guide their best-
interests analysis.70
When these evaluations occur, judges often substitute the profes-
sional’s decision for their own.71 In 2012, Anat Geva conducted semi-
structured in-depth interviews with seventeen Illinois district court
judges about their consideration of a parent’s mental illness when
making decisions regarding child custody.72 Geva found that her sam-
ple of judicial participants frequently did not even look at the evalua-
tion itself.73 They instead looked only at the recommendation and
used it to validate their own opinions.74 When judges substitute the
recommendation of the expert for their own best-interests analysis,
they may do so in part to confirm personal beliefs that the parent’s
mental illness has negatively affected the child.75 This analytical
strategy may lead to a confirmation bias in the evaluators.76 If a judge
orders an evaluation because she suspects parental mental illness, the
evaluator may be more likely to seek out evidence of mental illness.
This may make the evaluator more likely to over-pathologize the
parent.77
Confirmation bias is only one reason that a minority of judges are
distrustful of evaluation results. One judge in the aforementioned
study stated that mental health evaluations are “not science.”78 There
is much merit to this argument, as evaluators are far from perfect. In
fact, “[i]t is well noted that psychologists as a group are particularly
inaccurate in making future behavioral predictions and may be even
more inaccurate than laypersons.”79
More to the point, no validated psychological tests directly assess
parenting ability.80 With the knowledge that custody evaluations are
70. Geva, supra note 61, at 15–16.
71. Id. at 47; Mental Health and the Law, supra note 4.
72. Geva, supra note 61, at 7. The judges in the study oversaw custody determina-
tions. However, as previously indicated, the best interest of the child analysis is
the same for custody and termination decisions. Therefore, the analysis and re-
sults translate to termination decisions.
73. Id. at 47.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 66; See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998) (defining
confirmation bias as “the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are
partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand”).
77. Geva, supra note 61, at 69.
78. Id. at 58.
79. Id. at 68. See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (allowing expert testi-
mony regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness despite the evidence that
suggested that such expert predictions were inaccurate two-thirds of the time).
80. Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Mental Health Experts in Custody Decisions: Sci-
ence, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgment, 36 FAM. L.Q. 135, 144 (2002).
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not often relevant or reliable,81 the fact that many judges depend on
expert testimony to make these decisions is particularly problematic.
The most popular psychological test used to assess parental fitness as
it relates to the best interests of the child was not designed for custody
or termination evaluations.82 Yet a 1997 survey revealed that 92% of
the surveyed evaluators used the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI)83 in custody evaluations.84
The issue with this is that the MMPI was developed to assess se-
vere psychopathology—not parental fitness.85 It includes no scales de-
signed specifically for custody evaluations.86 The MMPI does not tell
the judge or evaluator what constitutes a “good” or “bad” parent and
will make no claim regarding which actions are in the best interests of
the child.87 This means that evaluators must necessarily infer paren-
tal fitness from the results of the MMPI.88 Although it is clinically
reliable, the MMPI is not relevant to custody or termination proceed-
ings. Despite the fact that the MMPI is commonly used to determine
whether keeping the child with a particular parent is in that child’s
best interest, these relevancy issues are rarely raised or addressed in
court.89
Two psychological tests were specifically designed for custody eval-
uations.90 However, use of the tests may be even more problematic
than the inferential use of the MMPI. The Ackerman-Schoendorf
Scales for Parent Evaluation of Custody (ASPECT) is the most fre-
quently used measure in child custody evaluations.91 It is a rating in-
strument used to assess parental fitness via interviews, a
questionnaire, and various objective and projective psychological
tests.92 Critics argue that the research on the validity of the ASPECT
is unconvincing, confusing, incomplete, and insubstantial.93
81. Id.
82. Id. at 145. The MMPI assumes that people who answer test questions in ways
that are similar to members of a particular group are likely to behave similarly to
members of that group. Id.
83. JAMES N. BUTCHER ET AL., MMPI-2: MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING
(rev. ed., 2001).
84. Shuman, supra note 80, at 144.




89. Id. at 146.
90. See MARC J. ACKERMAN & KATHLEEN SCHOENDORF, ASPECT: ACKERMAN-SCHOEN-
DORF SCALES FOR PARENT EVALUATION OF CUSTODY (1992); BARRY BRICKLIN, THE
BRICKLIN PERCEPTUAL SCALES: CHILD-PERCEPTION-OF-PARENTS SERIES (1984).
91. Shuman, supra note 80, at 152.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 153.
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The second most frequently used measure designed for custody
evaluations is the Bricklin Scales.94 The Bricklin Scales attempt to
measure parent and child attitudes and behaviors.95 Despite critics’
claims that it relies on unfounded assumptions, has not been well vali-
dated, and was developed on “inappropriately small, inadequately de-
scribed, or inappropriate clinical samples,” it is allowed unlimited use
in court.96 Nevertheless, the critiques of its validity are serious and
make it difficult to believe that the Scales actually measure the con-
structs they purport to measure—namely parental fitness and the
best interests of the child.97 To be sure, these tests are not measuring
parenting skills.98 Nor do they operationalize the best interests of the
child. At best, they attempt to measure parental pathology and the
attitudes and behaviors of the parents and children.99
C. The Stigmatization of Parents with Mental Challenges
Parents with mental challenges have been stigmatized by society
for as long as parents have had mental challenges. Until the 1960s,
English physicians advocated for the “complete separation of the men-
tally ill mother from her newborn” the moment the disorder began to
manifest.100 Researchers worldwide have attributed this horrible
practice to the stigmatization of those suffering from mental ill-
ness.101 Parenting while mentally ill was historically so taboo that
many women with mental illnesses were forced to secretly and shame-
fully give up their children for adoption.102 Many of them never saw
their children because the mothers were anesthetized for the birth
and the children were taken away before the mothers woke up.103 As a
result, many female hospital patients were not recognized as mothers
prior to the 1970s.104
1. Empirical Evidence of Stigma Against Parents with Mental
Challenges
A score of empirical evidence demonstrates that the stigmatization
of mentally challenged parents is not a thing of the past. In a recent
survey, 87% of those in a large sample of individuals suffering from
94. Id. at 150.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 151.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 154.
99. Id. at 150.
100. Cathy R. Schen, When Mothers Leave Their Children Behind, 13 HARV. REV. PSY-
CHIATRY 233, 235 (2005).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 240–41.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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psychosis reported experiencing stigma and discrimination.105 Men-
tally ill mothers106 are stereotyped as “dangerous, potentially violent,
and incapable.”107 Further, people view mental illness and mental re-
tardation as being controllable (i.e., the individual is responsible for
the onset and continuation of her disorder) and stable (i.e., not likely
to change over time).108 These stereotypes have real consequences for
stigmatized parents. People who have been labeled mentally ill are
less likely to find housing and employment and more likely to be
pressed with charges for violent crimes than those without the
label.109
For parents, the consequences can be catastrophic because the gen-
eral public seems to associate mental illness with poor parenting. In
fact, mothers with serious mental illnesses tend to fear that the public
equates schizophrenia with parental incompetence, neglect, and even
violence.110 This fear of the public’s stigmatizing attitudes causes
mothers to try to downplay their psychiatric symptoms—demonstrat-
ing their normality by describing their symptoms as a “nervous break-
down” in order to be seen as a good parent.111
The perception that society stigmatizes parents with mental chal-
lenges is not wrong. Nearly 63% of the participants in one study said
they would not allow an individual with schizophrenia to care for their
children for a couple of hours.112 Parents who are diagnosed with psy-
chiatric disorders are overrepresented in parental rights termination
105. THE SCHIZOPHRENIA COMM’N, THE ABANDONED ILLNESS: A REPORT BY THE SCHIZO-
PHRENIA COMMISSION 6 (2012).
106. Most of the empirical research on mentally ill parents focuses solely on mothers.
There is limited research about the stigmatization of mentally ill fathers. As a
result, most of the studies cited in this Comment focus exclusively on mothers.
See generally Barry J. Ackerson, Coping with the Dual Demands of Severe Mental
Illness and Parenting: The Parents’ Perspective, 84 FAMS. SOC’Y 109 (2003); Mary
V. Seeman, Intervention to Prevent Child Custody Loss in Mothers with Schizo-
phrenia, SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. & TREATMENT 1, 2 (2012).
107. Schen, supra note 100, at 235; see generally Be´ne´dicte Thonon & Frank Larøi,
What Predicts Stigmatisation About Schizophrenia? Results from a General Popu-
lation Survey Examining Its Underlying Cognitive, Affective and Behavioural
Factors, 9 PSYCHOSIS 99 (2017) (ten percent of participants believed that people
with schizophrenia were dangerous, fifty-three percent believed that people with
schizophrenia were unpredictable, and fifteen percent believed that people with
schizophrenia were incompetent).
108. Patrick W. Corrigan et al., Stigmatizing Attributions About Mental Illness, 28 J.
CMTY. PSYCHOL. 91 (2000) (showing that the public views people with psychiatric
disorders as less likely to overcome their illness than people with physical disor-
ders and illnesses).
109. Id. at 92.
110. Seeman, supra note 106, at 2.
111. Silvia Krumm et al., Mental Health Services for Parents Affected by Mental Ill-
ness, 26 CURRENT OP. PSYCHIATRY 362, 363 (2013).
112. Thonon & Larøi, supra note 107, at 102.
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hearings.113 Roughly half of mothers with schizophrenia lose either
temporary or permanent custody of their children.114
Merely labeling an individual as “mentally ill,” “psychotic,” or
“schizophrenic” is enough to trigger these unfortunate outcomes. A
leading researcher on stigma, Bruce Link, found that “members of the
general public were likely to stigmatize a person labeled mentally ill
even in the absence of any aberrant behavior.”115 Additionally, these
negative labels have a chilling effect on individuals’ willingness to
seek treatment.116 In a qualitative study, researchers found that par-
ents with mental illnesses were reluctant to seek treatment because
they were afraid they would lose custody of their children if they were
diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder.117 One individual commented:
“I self-diagnosed myself as a schizophrenic . . . I didn’t want to go to a
psychiatrist because I thought he would lock me up and I wanted to
raise my kids.”118 This individual’s fears were well-founded. Most of
the parents in this study who experienced custody-loss via the child
welfare system “felt that their diagnosis was also used against them
by child welfare workers.”119 These are the same child welfare work-
ers whose judgments as to the best interests of the child judges are apt
to substitute for their own.120
2. Judicial Reliance on Mental Illness in Parental Rights
Termination Proceedings
Most states include mental illness or mental deficiency as a ground
to terminate parental rights.121 However, the sole fact of mental chal-
lenge is not reason enough to terminate parental rights.122 For exam-
ple, the Nebraska statute only allows termination because of mental
113. Seeman, supra note 106, at 3.
114. Id. at 1.
115. Dror Ben-Zeev et al., DSM-V and the Stigma of Mental Illness, 19 J. MENTAL
HEALTH 318, 321 (2010).
116. Ackerson, supra note 106, at 112; see also Ben-Zeev et al., supra note 115, at 319
(defining “label avoidance” as a phenomenon whereby “people do not seek out or
participate in mental health services in order to avoid the egregious impact of a
stigmatizing label”).
117. Ackerson, supra note 106, at 112; see also Zach A. Dschaak & Cindy L. Juntunen,
Stigma, Substance Use, and Help-Seeking Attitudes Among Rural and Urban In-
dividuals, 42 J. RURAL MENTAL HEALTH 184 (2018) (identifying stigma as one of
the most common reasons that individuals suffering from mental illness cite to
explain their reluctance or refusal to seek treatment).
118. Ackerson, supra note 106, at 112.
119. Id. at 113.
120. For a discussion of the problems associated with child custody and parenting
evaluations, see supra subsection II.B.3.
121. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 226. For a discussion of “mental illness or
mental deficiency” as grounds for termination of parental rights, see supra sub-
section II.B.1.
122. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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illness or mental deficiency if the mental challenge renders the parent
“unable to discharge parental responsibilities.”123 Additionally, there
must be “reasonable grounds to believe that such condition will con-
tinue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”124 But mental illness or
mental deficiency is not defined anywhere in the statute.125 Likewise,
it is unclear exactly what constitutes a prolonged indeterminate
period.
Despite the vague nature of many of these statutes, the fact that
mental illness or mental deficiency is a common ground for termina-
tion means that judges often rely on it. In one study, judges indicated
that they paid the most attention to “parental mental stability, sense
of responsibility toward the children, moral character, and ability to
promote stable community involvement” when making custody deter-
minations.126 Additionally, the Adoption and Foster Care Reporting
and Analysis System found in 2017 that nearly 20% of the children in
foster care had been placed there because of a parent’s disability.127
As Part III of this Comment will discuss, the judicial reliance on
mental illness or mental deficiency as grounds to terminate parental
rights promotes the assumption that mental challenges prevent par-
ents from being able to improve their parenting abilities.128 Yet it is a
myth that people who suffer from mental illness, even serious psychi-
atric disorders, cannot or do not recover.129 This myth directly contra-
dicts the reality that people with mental challenges are capable of
becoming loving and supportive parents.130
3. Evidence That Parents with Mental Challenges Can Still Be
“Fit” Parents
Instead of actual evidence of mental challenge leading to poor
parenting, the perception that people with mental challenges are bad
parents seems to arise from a lack of evidence of the relationship be-
tween mental challenge and positive parenting. This is largely due to
the overrepresentation of mentally challenged parents in the child
welfare and court systems. Those “families headed by parents with
disabilities are overrepresented in the child welfare system, more
likely to have their children removed from their home, and more likely
to lose their parental rights.”131 The parents with severe mental disor-
123. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 2009).
124. Id.
125. See Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 932.
126. Geva, supra note 61, at 17–18 (emphasis added).
127. Review of Termination of Rights Cases, supra note 23, at 399.
128. Mental Health and the Law, supra note 4, at 327.
129. Ben-Zeev et al., supra note 115, at 322.
130. Mental Health and the Law, supra note 4, at 315.
131. Review of Termination of Rights Cases, supra note 23, at 399. It is important to
note that this data, like the majority of studies examining the child welfare sys-
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ders who do successfully raise their children do not get involved with
the child welfare system and do not find themselves fighting to protect
their parental rights in court. As researchers typically get their sam-
ples from court dockets and child welfare databases, court opinions do
not reflect, and research tends not to cover, those mentally challenged
parents who do succeed.132
The limited research that examines successful parenting by men-
tally challenged parents mostly focuses on parents with intellectual
disabilities. However, the small amount of research on parents with
other mental disorders provides similar results.133 This research sug-
gests that, as with all parents, some of those with mental disorders
are “ ‘fit’ to parent without special assistance,” some are “ ‘fit’ if given
assistance,” and some are “not ‘fit’ to parent with or without assis-
tance.”134 But, this fact—that parenting capabilities differ among peo-
ple—is no different for those without these mental challenges.
Similarly, it is true that parents with mental challenges face addi-
tional barriers when it comes to parenting. These barriers include,
among others, problems imposing discipline, maintaining appropriate
boundaries, retaining emotional control, as well as impairments
caused by illness symptoms or medication side-effects, and feelings of
guilt and fear as to how their illness may affect their children.135
However, this does not mean neurotypical parents do not struggle
with these same problems or that these problems cannot be remedied.
Despite the stereotypes that people with mental challenges make
poor parents, “scientific evidence . . . does not suggest a meaningful
correlation between mental retardation and inadequate parenting.”136
Nor does mental illness necessarily indicate abuse. In fact, one study
found that “poverty, stress, history of abuse, and social isolation” were
much better predictors of abuse than mental illness.137
tem, represents data collected in Australia, Great Britain and Canada. Id. Very
little research has examined the involvement of parents with mental disorders in
the United States child welfare system. Lightfoot & DeZelar, supra note 9. How-
ever, the limited research available suggests similar patterns in the United
States. See LaLiberte et al., supra note 9; Lightfoot & DeZelar, supra note 9.
132. Ackerson, supra note 106, at 109 (“Most of the research on mentally ill parents
has focused on their pathology and the potential harm to their children . . . .”).
133. Schen, supra note 100, at 236.
134. Chris Watkins, Beyond Status: The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pa-
rental Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or Mentally Retarded,
83 CAL. L. REV. 1415, 1449 (1995) (research focused on parents with mental disa-
bilities, but much of the research on mentally ill parents has similarly concluded
that parenting ability differs among individuals); see Schen, supra note 100, at
236.
135. Krumm et al., supra note 111, at 363.
136. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally
Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1990); see Schen, supra note 100,
at 236.
137. Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 928.
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The research ultimately shows that “the severity and treatability
of a mental illness,” rather than the mere existence of it, are the “most
important predictors of parenting success.”138 Fortunately, many
mental illnesses are treatable and do not cause permanent neglect or
maltreatment of children.139 Even those parents with mental impair-
ments that are not treatable can learn to improve their parenting abil-
ities.140 In fact, “parents with disabilities are not more likely to
maltreat their children than parents without disabilities.”141 Yet
“courts have terminated parental rights based on an emphasis on a
parent’s disability.”142
Furthermore, because child welfare protocols tend to view a par-
ent’s mental challenges as an indicator that the parent is likely to
abuse her child, child protection agencies may scrutinize those par-
ents with mental challenges harder than those without.143 This is un-
fortunate because child welfare workers struggle to accurately
recognize and support mentally challenged parents. A 2017 case re-
view found that only 75% of the parents in the surveyed cases were
correctly identified as having a disability.144 The caseworkers missed
the parent’s disability 25% of the time.145 Nearly half of the surveyed
cases lacked an intentional worker assessment of parenting ability
and necessary accommodations, and the caseworkers only visited the
parent in order to conduct a parenting assessment 20% of the time.146
This means that child welfare workers were not accurately identifying
the parents who needed accommodations, nor were they properly pro-
viding services for those parents. Only 12% of the services parents re-
ceived were designed to address their disabilities.147 And although
87% of the parents completed their treatment plans, every single one
of those 87% lost custody of their children.148
This data is alarming. It suggests that the misconceptions about
parents with mental challenges are more than misconceptions. They
are misconceptions with serious ramifications for the targeted par-
ents. Part III of this Comment argues that the vagueness of the stat-
utes on parental rights termination promotes the stigmatization of
mentally challenged parents. It further argues that those statutes
138. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 217.
139. Mental Health and the Law, supra note 4, at 310–11.
140. See, e.g., Krumm et al., supra note 111, at 363; Seeman, supra note 106, at 4;
Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 217–18.
141. Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 928.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Review of Termination of Rights Cases, supra note 23, at 405.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 403.
147. Id. at 404.
148. Id. at 406.
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that list mental illness or mental deficiency as a ground for termina-
tion are unnecessary and should be removed from state statutes.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Parental Rights Termination Statutes Promote the
Stigmatization of Parents with Mental Challenges
Parents with mental illness are disadvantaged when it comes to
the child welfare system and parental rights termination proceedings.
Statutes that allow termination of parental rights due to mental ill-
ness or mental deficiency promote the stigmatization of those parents
with mental challenges. These statutes shift the judicial focus from
the parent’s behavior to the parent’s mental condition, emphasizing
the diagnosis rather than the parent’s ability to care for his or her
child.149 To illustrate, mental illness or mental deficiency is one of the
only reasons for termination that is not based on the parent’s behavior
but is instead based on a factor that contributes to the parent’s behav-
ior.150 Terminating parental rights due to mental illness or mental
deficiency151 is vastly different than terminating parental rights be-
cause a parent “willfully neglected to provide the juvenile with the
necessary subsistence, education, or other care.”152 In the first case,
“mental illness” is used as a reason for termination, even though it is
only a contributing factor to the parent’s behavior. But in the later
instance, the statute does not allow judges to terminate parental
rights because a parent is poor, unemployed, or uneducated—even
though all of those factors may have contributed to the failure to pro-
vide the child with the “necessary subsistence, education, or other
care.”153
In this way, the diagnosis itself contributes to the stigmatization of
people with mental illness. A diagnosis suggests that all people who
share such a diagnosis are relatively the same.154 A diagnostic label
separates those with mental disorders from those without mental dis-
orders, and in the process, increases the salient nature of their “group-
ness.”155 If a diagnosis increases the perception of groupness, then it
widens the barrier between “us” (the non-mentally challenged) and
“them” (the mentally challenged). This growing barrier strengthens
the stereotype that people with mental challenges are inherently vio-
149. Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 933.
150. Id.
151. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 2016).
152. § 43-292(3).
153. Id.; Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 933.
154. Ben-Zeev et al., supra note 116, at 320.
155. Id. at 321. Groupness is “the degree to which a collection of people is perceived as
a unified or meaningful entity.” Id.
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lent or unfit to function in society.156 In this way, the statutes that
include mental disease or mental deficiency as a ground for termina-
tion create two groups: mentally challenged parents and “normal” par-
ents. “Normal” becomes equated with “good.” And “mentally
challenged” becomes equated with “bad.”157
A judge cannot deny custody or terminate parental rights solely
because a parent has a mental disorder.158 But that does not mean
that judges are not weighing the existence of a mental disorder more
heavily than they should. Nor does it mean that judges are not equat-
ing “mental disorder” with “bad parent.” In fact, the evidence supports
the argument that they are doing just that, as mentally ill parents are
more likely to lose custody of their children than those parents with-
out mental illness.159 Some studies have even found that “the pre-
sumption of incompetence evoked by the diagnosis of intellectual
disability is so influential that evidence challenging it may not be
readily accepted.”160
One study compared parents with serious psychiatric disorders
(e.g., personality disorders and psychosis) to those parents with less-
serious neurotic disorders (e.g., agoraphobia, panic disorder, and mild
depression).161 The parents with severe psychiatric disorders did not
pose any higher risk to their children than the parents with neurotic
disorders.162 Diagnosis thus did not predict risk, types of mistreat-
ment, rates of prior agency involvement, or rejection of court-ordered
services.163 However, diagnosis did predict which parents retained
custody of their children.164 Twenty percent of the parents with less-
serious neurotic disorders had their children permanently re-
moved.165 Compare that to eighty percent of the parents with severe
psychiatric disorders who had their children permanently removed.166
This difference occurred even though the parents with more severe
diagnoses posed no greater risk to their children than those parents
with less severe diagnoses.167
Though it is unlikely that judges are intentionally and hatefully
punishing mentally challenged parents by terminating parental
156. Id.; Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 225.
157. See Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 929.
158. Dane & Rosen, supra note 47, at 10.
159. Id.
160. Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 929.
161. Carol G. Taylor et al., Diagnosed Intellectual and Emotional Impairment Among
Parents Who Seriously Mistreat Their Children: Prevalence, Type, and Outcome
in a Court Sample, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 389 (1991).
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rights, judges may fall prey to the inaccurate stereotypes that parents
with mental challenges are “dangerous, potentially violent, and inca-
pable”168 merely because judges do not have a sufficient understand-
ing of “the nature of mental illness, the state of mental health
research, or scientifically valid ways to assess the effect of mental ill-
ness on parenting.”169
In Anat Geva’s 2012 examination of Illinois judges, Geva found
wide variation in whether and how these judges looked at parental
mental illness.170 For example, one judge said she considered the fact
that litigation stress “may exacerbate [a parent’s] mental health
symptoms,” but other judges refused to make a custody determination
under the assumption that a parent’s mental health status would im-
prove after litigation.171 Geva’s results also suggested that judges
“generally do not possess adequate knowledge and training to be able
to make sufficiently informed decisions about the best interests of the
child where a contesting parent has a mental health problem.”172 For
example, most of the judges indicated that they did not care if the
parent had depression, arguing that they would not terminate paren-
tal rights over such a common illness.173 This reasoning suggests that
the judges operated on preconceived notions of mental illness. De-
pending on the severity of the illness, a depressed parent could be just
as unfit as a parent with schizophrenia. Yet these judges’ comments
suggest that they would only consider mental illness in the case of a
parent with schizophrenia.
The judges drew upon personal knowledge and experience to make
these complicated decisions.174 Yet, the same judges admitted that
they were not psychologists.175 It has been well documented that
judges often struggle to understand scientific concepts. For example,
one study looked at criteria Finnish judges find most important when
evaluating expert testimony.176 The researchers found that judges fo-
168. Schen, supra note 100, at 235.
169. Geva, supra note 61, at 8. See subsection II.B.3 supra for a discussion of the diffi-
culties of evaluating whether and how mental illness affects parental fitness.
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 27–28.
172. Id. at 8.
173. Id. at 33 (“Depression seemed to be perceived as a transitory impairment that
does not have permanent implications on parenting.”). Most judges indicated that
people with mild depression could still function as parents. The judges considered
depressive symptoms to be a response to the trauma and stress of the divorce and
custody proceedings, ignoring the possibility that the depression may not be a
stress response and may therefore continue well beyond the final custody ruling.
Id.
174. Id. at 58.
175. Id.
176. Alessandro Tadei et al., Judges’ Capacity to Evaluate Psychological and Psychiat-
ric Expert Testimony, 68 NORDIC PSYCHOL. 204 (2016).
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cused mostly on the expert’s work experience—which says nothing
about the quality of the data—and the scientific community’s accept-
ance of the evidence.177 They did not care at all about falsifiability,178
which suggested that they did not understand the importance of that
scientifically central construct.179 An American study further sug-
gested that receiving conflicting expert opinions validates both opin-
ions, even if only a small minority of experts holds one opinion.180
Thus, when judges are provided with evidence from multiple experts
regarding which course of action is in the child’s best interests, con-
flicting testimony may hinder the judge’s ability to distinguish the
most accurate testimony (assuming they are able to understand the
psychological testimony at all).
Because judges do not know how to distinguish good or valid expert
testimony from bad testimony that may conform to the judges’ prede-
termined opinions, judges are likely to simply take a parenting evalu-
ation at face value.181 This is problematic given the harsh criticism of
the measures used in parenting evaluations.182 The process by which
these evaluations occur has been criticized as well. A single psychia-
trist typically conducts the evaluations in a single interview, if an in-
terview occurs at all.183 Arguably, because the psychiatrist has such
limited interaction with the mentally challenged parent—and because
the measures used over the course of the evaluation have not been
constructed to assess parental fitness184—the psychiatrist may ulti-
mately come to a conclusion based on presumptions about mentally
challenged parents as a group rather than observations about the par-
ticular parent at issue.185 Ultimately, removing mental illness or
mental deficiency as grounds for termination from statutory language
will protect mentally challenged parents from the stigma that is often
177. Id.
178. Falsifiability means that a theory can be tested and proven wrong. Expert testi-
mony is falsifiable if “the expert’s statement can principally be proven wrong.” Id.
at 209. This is different than asking if the expert is wrong. Falsifiability asks, “If
I test this theory or this statement, is it possible that it is false?” Scientific inquir-
ies that are not falsifiable are not testable.
179. Tadei et al., supra note 176.
180. Derek J. Koehler, Can Journalistic “False Balance” Distort Public Perception of
Consensus in Expert Opinion?, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 24 (2016). In this
study, participants who read conflicting comments from disagreeing experts and
viewed a count of the number of experts who favored each side were less able to
distinguish which issues had strong versus weak expert consensus than those
participants who only saw the count information. Id.
181. Geva, supra note 61, at 47.
182. See supra subsection II.B.3 for a discussion of the lack of relevance and reliability
associated with common psychological tests used to evaluate parental fitness.
183. Margolin, supra note 26, at 156.
184. Shuman, supra note 80, at 144.
185. Margolin, supra note 26, at 156.
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present in the termination process. Furthermore, removing this
ground from statutes will not increase the risk of harm to children.
B. Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency as a Ground for
Termination Does Not Protect Children
1. Mental Illness or Mental Deficiency is Rarely the Only
Ground for Termination
Judges often rely on mental illness to terminate parental rights in
cases where there are other, non-stigmatizing reasons to terminate.
For example, in State v. Brandy S., the court terminated Brandy’s pa-
rental rights under Nebraska Revised Statutes sections 43-292(2),186
(5),187 (6),188 and (7).189 Brandy was physically and verbally abu-
sive.190 She took no action when she learned that her children had
been sexually abused (and, in fact, she took the children to visit their
assailant in jail).191 This abuse and neglect alone should have been
enough evidence to demonstrate the parental unfitness necessary to
terminate under § 43-292(2).192 Even though it was unnecessary to
achieve the desired outcome, the court still used Brandy’s mental ill-
ness diagnoses as a reason to terminate her parental rights.193
Likewise, in State v. Tracy G.,194 the court terminated Tracy’s pa-
rental rights under sections 43-292(5),195 (6),196 and (7).197 Again the
court focused on mental illness despite sufficient other grounds. The
court emphasized Tracy’s depressive disorder and “mild mental retar-
dation” diagnoses.198 Yet the court did not need to focus on Tracy’s
mental disorders when it had support for two other grounds for termi-
nation. These cases demonstrate how judges tend to use a parent’s
mental challenges as grounds to terminate parental rights even in
cases where parental rights could be terminated on other bases.199
186. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(2) (Reissue 2016) (emphasizing neglect).
187. § 43-292(5) (emphasizing mental illness or mental deficiency).
188. § 43-292(6) (emphasizing failure of reasonable efforts).
189. § 43-292(7) (stating the 15/22 provision).
190. State v. Brandy S. (In re Nicole M.), 287 Neb. 685, 708, 844 N.W.2d 65, 82 (2014).
191. Id. at 687–88.
192. § 43-292(2) (“The parents have substantially and continuously or repeatedly ne-
glected and refused to give the juvenile or a sibling of the juvenile necessary pa-
rental care and protection.”).
193. Brandy S., 287 Neb. at 706, 844 N.W.2d at 81.
194. State v. Tracy G. (In re Interest of Ashe G.), No. A-12-748, 2013 WL 2106759
(Neb. App. Apr. 23, 2013).
195. § 43-292(5) (emphasizing mental illness or mental deficiency).
196. § 43-292(6) (emphasizing failure of reasonable efforts).
197. § 43-292(7) (stating the 15/22 provision).
198. Tracy G., 2013 WL 2106759, at *1.
199. But see, e.g., State v. Tammie S., 14 Neb. App. 202, 211 (2005) (after determining
that statutory grounds for termination under NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(7) had
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Removing the “mental illness and mental deficiency” language
from these statutes would still allow courts to terminate the parental
rights of parents whose mental challenges are so severe that they are
unable to care for their children. Removing the statutory language
merely prevents courts from relying on a parent’s mental challenge
when it is unnecessary to do so. For example, Utah’s parental rights
termination statute does not list mental illness or mental deficiency as
a statutory condition for termination.200 However, parental rights
may be terminated if it is found that “the parent is unfit or incompe-
tent.”201 Mental illness may then be used as evidence of parental un-
fitness or incompetence.202
In A.E. v. State, the Utah Court of Appeals held that “mental ill-
ness that is so extreme as to render a parent unable to care for the
needs of her children or . . . to comply with the requirements of [the]
service plan . . . may actually be evidence of unfitness.”203 The Utah
court thus found a way to rely on mental illness without a statute
providing for reliance on mental illness. The fact that states that do
not list “mental illness or mental deficiency” as a ground for termina-
tion still manage to terminate parental rights when parents abuse or
neglect their children suggests that there is no reason to specifically
allow for termination because of a parent’s mental status.204
2. Termination Does Not Ensure Stability for the Children
The ASFA and state statutes that allow for termination when the
parent is unfit because of mental illness or mental deficiency are well-
intentioned. They are intended to protect children—to ensure that
children are not being raised in homes where they are abused or ne-
glected, to provide children with stability, and to ensure that kids are
not spending their childhoods drifting from foster home to foster
home.205 After all, “spending extended periods of time in foster care
can have serious negative ramifications on children.”206 Likewise, ter-
minating parental rights increases stress, anxiety, and trauma for
both children and parents.207
However, termination does not ensure stability for the child any
more than it ensures the child will soon be removed from foster care.
In Tracy G., the court terminated Tracy’s parental rights in part to
been met, the court refused to evaluate Tammie’s mental illness as an additional
ground for termination).
200. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507 (2019).
201. § 78A-6-507(1)(c).
202. A.E. v. State (State ex rel. G.R.), 191 P.3d 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
203. Id. at 1241.
204. Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 927.
205. See Nicholson, supra note 18.
206. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 220.
207. Id. at 224.
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promote stability for her son, Ashe.208 The court emphasized the im-
portance of providing Ashe with “routine, structure, and predictabil-
ity.”209 However, while the court noted that Ashe was doing well in
foster care, it never described an adoption plan for Ashe.210 It is there-
fore possible that the court terminated Tracy’s parental rights in order
to provide stability for Ashe, with no plan for how to provide Ashe
with a stable life.
Statistics provide additional support for the argument that termi-
nating parental rights does not ensure adoption.211 At the end of 2015,
the United States had 428,000 children in foster care.212 112,000 of
these children were “waiting for adoption.”213 Fifty-six percent of
these children (62,400 children) came from families whose parental
rights had been terminated.214 In fact, “the number of children wait-
ing for adoption from 2011 to 2015 almost consistently exceeded the
number of children adopted in all states.”215 The pattern is the same
in Nebraska. In 2016, Nebraska had 715 children still waiting for
adoption, 463 of which came from families whose parental rights had
been terminated.216 These numbers suggest no reason “to terminate
the parental rights of a child who lacks a concrete adoption plan, even
if reunification seems far-fetched at the time the agency contemplates
filing a [petition to terminate parental rights].”217
C. Alternatives to Termination
Including the phrase “mental illness or mental deficiency” in pa-
rental rights termination statutes promotes the stigmatization of par-
ents with mental challenges,218 fails to protect children from “foster
care drift,”219 and will not prevent judges from terminating parental
rights when absolutely necessary.220 Thus, there is no reason to con-
tinue including this language in parental rights termination statutes.
208. State v. Tracy G. (In re Interest of Ashe G.), No. A-12-748, 2013 WL 2106759, at
*4 (Neb. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013).
209. Id. at *3.
210. Id.
211. Margolin, supra note 26, at 164–65.






216. Children Waiting for Adoption, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, https://cwoutcomes.acf.hhs
.gov/cwodatasite/waiting/index [https://perma.unl.edu/47FP-Y7MD] (last visited
Aug. 19, 2019).
217. Margolin, supra note 26, at 167–68.
218. See supra section III.A.
219. See supra subsection III.B.2.
220. See supra subsection III.B.1.
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It simply makes it too easy for judges to terminate the parental rights
of mentally challenged parents. Alternatives to termination should
therefore be considered to help reduce the high proportion of mentally
challenged parents who have lost parental rights to their children.221
1. Provide Parents with More Time for Treatment
Ultimately, it is the symptoms of mental illness—rather than the
diagnosis itself—that makes it more difficult for people with mental
challenges to become adequate parents. Evidence suggests that these
symptoms “may inhibit parents’ ability to maintain a good balance at
home and make parents less communicative, less emotionally involved
in their children’s [daily] lives, and less reliable.”222 However, it is
also true that parenting stress decreases and parental nurturing in-
creases as a mentally ill parent’s clinical symptoms are reduced.223
Thus, a family’s situation can greatly improve through the effective
use of “parenting classes, clinical treatment, capacity-building pro-
grams, and other support services.”224
Because the 15/22 provision of the ASFA (and the various state
statutes that have adopted this provision) requires the state to file for
a parental rights termination hearing if the child has been in foster
care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months, parents with
mental challenges are forced to be treated on a nearly-impossibly fast
timeline.225 Even assuming that the parents are provided with the
necessary services immediately after the child is removed from the
home, fifteen months is often not enough time for mentally challenged
parents to make enough progress to return to their parental
responsibilities.226
For example, in State v. Amber, Amber’s children had been re-
moved from Amber’s “cluttered and unsanitary” home.227 Amber had
been diagnosed with a series of mental illnesses, including “ADHD,
major depressive disorder, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, ob-
sessive compulsive disorder . . . hoarding disorder and borderline per-
221. Review of Termination of Rights Cases, supra note 23, at 399.
222. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 218 (internal quotations and punctuation
removed).
223. Geva, supra note 61, at 84.
224. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 220.
225. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103, 111 Stat.
2115, 2118 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
226. See Seeman, supra note 106, at 4 (“Policies intended to promote a speedy resolu-
tion for children in out-of-home care may unintentionally discriminate against
parents with mental illness because they fast-track the termination of parental
rights, allowing only a brief time period for new parents to meet the goals set by
child protection agencies.”); Mental Health and the Law, supra note 4, at 335.
227. State v. Amber (In re Interest of Hunter L.), Nos. A-17-652, A-17-653, 2018 WL
332941, at *1 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018).
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sonality disorder.”228 The court terminated Amber’s parental rights
because Amber’s mental illnesses made her unable to maintain a
house that was safe for her children to live.229
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the court terminated Amber’s
parental rights despite her attempts to resolve the issues that led to
her children’s removal. For example, Amber began attending ther-
apy.230 Prior to the termination, she had completed twelve individual
sessions, and it was noted that she “had been engaged and participat-
ing in the sessions and had achieved the first set of goals set for
her.”231 However, the court still terminated her parental rights be-
cause it felt she had not progressed fast enough.232 Had Amber been
given more time, she may have progressed to a point where it was safe
for her children to return home. The fifteen-month timeline was just
too short for her.
Similarly, in State v. Deeada N.,233 Deeada’s parental rights were
terminated under § 43-292(5) of Nebraska Revised Statues.234 Deeada
had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, an anxiety disorder,
a personality disorder, and a cognitive disorder.235 Despite Deeada’s
willingness to participate in therapy, evaluations, and occupational
training in order to learn how to become a more fit parent, the court
still terminated her parental rights.236 The proposed treatment plan
could have taken up to eighteen months to complete, and the court
was not willing to allow Deeada the additional time.237
It is important to note that Deeada’s parental rights were termi-
nated with seemingly no adoption plan in place.238 The court termi-
nated Deeada’s parental rights in order to keep Bruce from
“[spending] his early years suspended in foster care.”239 However,
with no adoption plan in place, Bruce may well have spent the next
eighteen months in foster care anyway.
In 2015 in Nebraska, only 3% of children waiting for adoption were
adopted in under one year.240 Just under 30% of children waiting for
adoption were adopted between one and two years.241 That means
228. Id. at *2.
229. Id. at *5.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id.
232. Id. at *5.
233. State v. Deaada N. (In re Interest of Bruce N.), No. A-11-256, 2011 WL 4028267
(Neb. Ct. App. Sep. 6, 2011).
234. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 2009) (mental illness or deficiency).
235. Deaada N., 2011 WL 4028267, at *3.
236. Id. at *5.
237. Id. at *6.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 212, at 55–56.
241. Id.
2020] STATUTORY STIGMATIZATION 773
that over 67% of the children awaiting adoption were waiting for more
than two years.242 Bruce may have been one of those children, and
Deaada may have been able to become a court-approved parent in that
amount of time.
2. It Takes a Village—Parenting Does Not Have to Be All or
Nothing
The termination of parental rights has been described as the “civil
death penalty.”243 Termination therefore must be the very last resort
to protect the welfare of the children. Parents have a fundamental
right to raise and rear their children,244 but that fundamental right
does not equate to a fundamental requirement to parent alone. Many
of these cases fail to consider community options that may allow the
biological family to remain together while the parents work to improve
their parental fitness.
For example, Nebraska allows the juvenile court to enter orders
following termination of parental rights that permit continued contact
with the biological parent if it is in the best interests of the child.245
Although parental rights are terminated, “an adoption that offers a
way to maintain a relationship with her child can motivate the mother
toward recovery and health.”246 However, it is unclear how often these
orders are permitted, as Nebraska courts seem hesitant to allow the
parent–child relationship to continue after parental rights have been
terminated.247
Similarly, subsidized guardianship allows relatives or other
caregivers to become legal guardians for children who cannot return to
a biological parent’s home or be adopted.248 Thirty-nine states allow
for this alternative to termination.249 Some states even allow for a
judge to order subsidized guardianship in lieu of parental rights ter-
242. Id.
243. Overview of Terminating Parental Rights, FAMILY LAW SELF-HELP CENTER,
https://www.familylawselfhelpcenter.org/self-help/adoption-termination-of-paren
tal-rights/overview-of-termination-of-parental-rights [https://perma.unl.edu/
HP44-MQG8] (last visited Dec. 12, 2018).
244. Margolin, supra note 26, at 134–35, 153.
245. See State v. Pam N. (In re Interest of Stacey D.), 684 N.W.2d 594 (Neb. Ct. App.
2004).
246. Schen, supra note 100, at 241.
247. See In re Interest of R.H., T.H., & J.H., 219 Neb. 904, 907, 367 N.W.2d 145, 147
(1985) (“The law is not unmindful of a mother’s love, of the crippling effects of a
history of child abuse and alcoholic parents, and of the grinding effects of an in-
ferior education and habitual poverty, but the law is also not so cruel that punish-
ment for these apparently unchangeable conditions should be imposed on the
children. If the only way to break the chain is termination, the law and this court
will not flinch.”).
248. Margolin, supra note 26, at 175.
249. Id.
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mination, even if grounds for termination have been proven.250 This
option allows parents to retain their parental rights while still ensur-
ing that their children are cared for—in fact, ensuring that their chil-
dren will not languish in foster care.251
Another alternative to termination is a community residence.
Take, for example, a parent like Amber who suffers from such severe
mental challenges that she cannot maintain a safe and sanitary home
for her children.252 Amber loved and bonded with her children, and
she wanted to take steps to improve her parenting capabilities.253
However, the court said it was not enough that Amber got help clean-
ing her house because she could not do it herself.254 Termination may
not have been necessary had the court allowed Amber and her chil-
dren to move into a community residence where Amber could receive
clinical treatment while her children grew up in a sanitary environ-
ment. Termination may also not have been necessary had the court
allowed Amber to live with somebody who would help keep her house
clean. Amber’s situation is not uncommon. One common need ex-
pressed by mothers with mental challenges is the “need for long-term
support in their homes by someone visiting to provide practical help
with parenting.”255
There is no constitutional requirement that parents must raise and
rear their children alone. There is even court precedent of accommo-
dating parents who struggle with physical disabilities.256 In Helen L.
v. DiDario, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that Penn-
sylvania had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act because it
did not provide in-home services to a mother who used a wheel-
chair.257 Thus, courts have supported community aid for parents who
cannot physically care for their children.258 The fact that physically
challenged parents, but not mentally challenged parents, can receive
these services prior to termination of parental rights suggests that
termination is not always used as a last resort when it comes to par-
ents with mental challenges. It also adds credence to the argument
that the high rates of termination for parents with mental challenges
250. Id. But see In re Interest of C.A.A., 229 Neb. 135, 138–39, 425 N.W.2d 621, 621
(1988) (refusing to establish a guardianship and foster care placement in lieu of
parental rights termination when “the parent cannot assume the role of the
parent.”).
251. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 212.
252. State v. Amber (In re Interest of Hunter L.), Nos. A-17-652, A-17-653, 2018 WL
332941, at *1 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018).
253. Id.
254. Id. at *7–8.
255. Krumm, supra note 111, at 364.
256. Margolin, supra note 26, at 137.
257. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
258. Margolin, supra note 26, at 137.
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are driven, at least in part, by stigma.259 Removing the statutory lan-
guage that explicitly allows judges to consider the parent’s mental
challenges may help reduce some of that stigma.
IV. CONCLUSION
Parents with mental challenges are disproportionately at risk of
losing their parental rights to their children.260 However, they are no
more likely to abuse or mistreat their children than those parents
without mental challenges.261 These parents are often unfairly evalu-
ated in court, where they are asked to display unfair, or even unfeasi-
ble, standards of independence.262 When the evaluations and court
hearings focus on what a mentally challenged parent cannot do, the
court overlooks what the parent can do.263 Because the tools used in
parental evaluations are not valid assessments of parenting abili-
ties,264 and because judges are susceptible to the stereotype that men-
tally challenged parents are “dangerous, potentially violent, and
incapable,”265 courts do not take notice of the large amount of variabil-
ity in the nature and severity of these mental disorders.266
Statutory language that allows courts to terminate parental rights
when they find parental unfitness due to mental illness or mental de-
ficiency allows courts to focus on the parent’s clinical diagnosis rather
than his or her actual parenting ability.267 This allows judges to, im-
plicitly or explicitly, promote the stigmatization of mentally chal-
lenged parents. This statutory language is unnecessary, as courts
without this statutory language are still able to terminate the paren-
tal rights of those mentally challenged parents who are not willing to
or capable of caring for their children.268 In fact, termination often
causes more problems than it solves because the children of parents
who lose their parental rights often end up languishing in foster
care.269 In these cases, everybody loses. The parents lose constitution-
ally protected rights and the children are not provided with loving and
stable homes.
Rather than terminate parental rights under the assumption that
parents with mental challenges cannot or will not improve their pa-
259. See Review of Termination Cases, supra note 23.
260. Dane & Rosen, supra note 47, at 10.
261. Taylor et al., supra note 161, at 398.
262. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 225.
263. Id.
264. See supra subsection II.B.3.
265. Thonon & Larøi, supra note 107; Schen, supra note 100, at 235.
266. Finding Solutions, supra note 6, at 223.
267. Inclusion of Disability, supra note 12, at 933.
268. Id. at 934.
269. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 212, at 16–18; CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note
216.
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rental fitness, courts should promote the reunification of biological
families by allowing parents with mental challenges to parent to the
best of their abilities—even if that means receiving parenting assis-
tance from the local community.270 Removing statutory language that
allows judges to rely on the existence of these mental challenges when
terminating parental rights is one step closer to reducing the stigmati-
zation of mentally challenged parents without putting the welfare of
their children at risk.
270. For a discussion of alternatives to termination, see supra subsection III.C.2.
